#0day

30 posts · Last used Sep 26

🤖 CISA KEV: the "MikroTrick" chain (CVE-2026-67279 + CVE-2026-86060) grants unauthenticated full admin access to internet-exposed MikroTik RouterOS 7.x. Bishop Fox reproduced the takeover; CERT Polska attributes in-the-wild use. Same KEV batch: SharePoint CVE-2026-65660 (CVSS 8.8) RCE now exploited. 🔗 https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/sharepoint-rce-and-mikrotik-routeros.html #CVE #MikroTik #0day #CyberSec
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The FIDO Alliance publishes certificates for "Device attestation" for Passkeys through something called the FIDO Metadata Service(MDS). The idea here is that a service can restrict the use of passkeys to certain vendors. (One can argue whether that's a problematic, user-hostile feature to begin with.) Looking through the certificates, we find this "interesting" cert: "CN=FIDO2 Enterprise Attestation BATCH KEY prime256v1, emailAddress=tools@fidoalliance.org, O=FIDO Alliance, OU=Authenticator Attestation, C=US, ST=MY, L=Wakefield" Its Issuer looks even more interesting: "CN=FIDO2 Enterprise Attestation TEST ROOT, emailAddress=tools@fidoalliance.org, O=FIDO Alliance, OU=CWG, C=US, ST=CA, L=Mountain View" It's not the only one in there that implies it's some form of "test" cert. However, this one is particularly interesting, as... it's also, apparently, using a "test" private key, which you can find here: https://github.com/fido-alliance/conformance-test-tools-resources/blob/main/docs/FIDO2/Authenticator/README.md In case you want to pretend that you're building a "KQC QuKey Bio FIDO2 Authenticator", that may come in handy. It's not the only odd issue in that list, there are also plenty of certs with encoding errors. See, e.g.: https://github.com/fido-alliance/fido-device-onboard-feedback/issues/5 (Found together with @duesee@norden.social ) #0day #passkeys #fido
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StyleSmuggler: Magento and Adobe Commerce 0-day RCE under active attack Pulse ID: 6aa8f78f28a8d7073b557898 Pulse Link: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6aa8f78f28a8d7073b557898 Pulse Author: Tr1sa111 Created: 2026-09-15 07:45:19 Be advised, this data is unverified and should be considered preliminary. Always do further verification. #0Day #Adobe #Magento #RCE #OTX #Tr1sa111
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🤖 Hackers target US firms in FastJson RCE zero-day attacks. Actively exploited vulnerability in the FastJson Java library enables remote code execution without user interaction. CISA monitoring ongoing. No patch available — only mitigation is blocking JNDI lookups. 🔗 https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-target-us-firms-in-fastjson-rce-zero-day-attacks/ #CVE #RCE #Exploit #0day #CyberSec
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🚨 New 0-day: SonicWall SMA 1000 pre-auth RCE chain (CVSS 9.8). No creds, no appliance knowledge — just an address. 1️⃣ Struts 1 multipartRequestHandler property injection rewrites Jetty auth filter mappings → /Console + console unauthenticated 2️⃣ Enable CMS → unauth SSO Primary Admin token → JSESSIONID 3️⃣ Java deser via setStoredCommunity (BeanComparator+TemplatesImpl) → RCE as mgmt-server (uid=1011) Output → webroot → anonymous GET. Full analysis + PoC: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/sonicwall-sma-preauth-deserialization-rce #0day #RCE #Infosec
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Came across a disclosure in Altus BluePlant 9.1.40 — a SCADA HMI / ICS platform. CVSS 9.8, unauthenticated RCE, default configuration, as the service account (administrator). The standout: the vendor's auth validator hardcodes three credential-bypass paths in code. Use any one to bypass Connect, get a connectionHandle, then drive a generic RMI gateway to FileServer.RunProcess → Process.Start. No creds, no TLS, port 3100 reachable by default after install. Full root-cause + self-contained PoC on the advisory page. https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/altus-blueplant-hardcoded-creds-rce https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The project attributes discovery to an automated multi-LLM process (Claude/OpenAI/DeepSeek/GLM), defensive framing, full-disclosure posture. Not affiliated; noting for awareness. #infosec #ICS #SCADA #OTsecurity #vulnerability #0day #RCE #exploit
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@volexity@infosec.exchange has published details on a recent incident response investigation involving the exploitation of multiple #0day vulnerabilities in SonicWall SMA 1000 series appliances. Volexity attributes this activity to a threat actor it tracks as UTA0533, with the earliest signs of compromise dating back to June 22, 2026. SonicWall has released patches (versions 12.4.3-03453 and 12.5.0-02835) following their July 14 public disclosure. Organizations using affected SMA 1000 series devices should upgrade immediately. Read our full technical breakdown, including the vulnerability workflow, malware analysis, and IOCs: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2026/07/17/proxying-to-compromise-sonicwall-secure-mobile-access-0-day-exploitation/ #dfir #memoryforensics #threatintel
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