2026-08-05 00:22 UTC
@tao@mathstodon.xyz How exactly would you define 'canonicalization' in a way that is more clear to laypeople?
In mathematics before formalization, it seems like the point of a proof was to make an assertion so clearly and obviously true that the very act of reading the proof and understanding it made it obvious that the proved statement was true. I think this should be the new definition (which I do not think mathematicians do very much these days). It seems like there wasn't as much proof "checking" in the past. If a proof did not convince you: for the purposes of verification, it failed, even if it was correct. This is not to say that such 'unconvincing' proofs failed in every respect of course: far from it. But for the purposes of verification, should it be the case that an unconvincing proof is acceptable at all? Without the motivation of being 'convincing' in this archaic sense (e.g. wrt Ruffini and Galois proof), would we have developed the machinery of vector spaces, field extensions, k-algebras?
In this sense, I think something has been lost in this area, even before the current affair of 'proof abundance'. Today, the machinery and abstractions we develop as mathematicians seem to often be about making things cleaner, easier or more elegant instead of about being convincing. Being convincing (again in the archaic sense, not in the formal 'proof certificate' sense) is I think what we should think about moving towards. I think this also necessarily relates to the rate at which we produce new proofs, since being convincing in a societal sense also has very much to do with cultural dissemination and brain plasticity: since these determine what facts are 'obviously and widely known' or 'just common sense'.
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